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Protecting the Public, Not Anyone's Turf:
The Unlicensed Practice of Law in
Securities Arbitration
John P. Cleary*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the late- 1980s, the United States Supreme Court determined that mandatory
arbitration clauses in broker-dealer customer agreements are binding on investors.'
As a result, in the last decade, securities arbitration has become the primary method
of resolving disputes between investors and broker-dealers.2 The emergence of
private arbitration as the most common dispute resolution mechanism for
disgruntled investors, together with the accessibility of the stock market to the
masses, has created a booming cottage industry for nonlawyer advocates who
openly solicit investors to pursue claims against their stockbrokers to recover
losses.
Notwithstanding each state's proscription against the unlicensed practice of
law, nonlawyers nationwide freely represent investors pursuing claims against

* Mr. Cleary is an associate in the San Diego, California office of Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich, LLP,
which frequently serves as counsel to brokerage firms in securities arbitrations. Mr. Cleary received
his J.D. from the University of Missouri in 1994 where he was a member of the Law Review. He is
currently admitted to practice in California, Missouri, and Kansas.
1. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987).
2. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE
ARBITRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE 6 (1996) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. When an investor
opens a brokerage account, he or she is invariably presented with a customer agreement containing a
pre-dispute arbitration clause wherein the investor agrees to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the
account. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 423
(1989).

broker-dealers in arbitration.3 These nonlawyers state and maintain legal claims,
construct theories of damage, participate in motion practice (both oral and written),
conduct discovery and settlement negotiations, sometimes take depositions, and
ultimately represent investors at hearings. 4 At the hearing, these representatives
make opening and closing statements, legal objections, and examine and
cross-examine witnesses.' Although none of this activity occurs before a court of
law, it clearly constitutes the "practice of law" under relevant California case law.
Statistically, California has the highestpresence of nonlawyer representatives. 6
The time has come for the California Supreme Court to enjoin this practice. Since
the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the privatization of securities disputes, investor
representation in arbitration has come to require legal skill and knowledge of the
law greater than that possessed by the average citizen. Today, more than ever
before, pursuing claims through nonlawyer representatives seriously disadvantages
investors. Equally important, nonlawyer representation also harms the public by
allowing unethical conduct and malpractice to go unpunished and undeterred
because nonlawyer representatives, unlike licensed attorneys, are wholly
unregulated and unsanctionable. 7
This Article states a case for an advisory opinion in California precluding
nonlawyers from representing investors for compensation in securities arbitration.
The Article first discusses the legal standards for determining what activities
constitute the practice of law in California, including an analysis of the Supreme
Court of California's recent decision expanding the definition of the "practice of
law" to include representation in the private arbitration context Next, it discusses
the nature of investor representation in securities arbitration and details the extent
to which nonlawyer representation compromises the rights of investors. 9 Finally,
this Article addresses the various harms to the public that result from nonlawyer
representation in arbitration, including an analysis of the arguments maintained by
nonlawyer representatives in favor of the status quo. 10

3. See SICA, Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitrationon Representationof
Parties in Arbitrationby Non-Attorneys [hereinafter SICA REPORT], 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507,
512-13(1995). Currently, only Florida, Ohio, Michigan and Illinois preclude nonlawyer representation
in securities arbitration.
4. See The Florida Bar Re Advisory Opinion On Nonlawyer Representation In Securities
Arbitration, 696 So.2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1997) [hereinafter FloridaBar].
5. See id.
6. See Justin P. Klein, Non-Attorney Representation,63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1605, 1607 (1995)
(stating that "most, if not all, of these groups seemed to be located in Florida and California").
7. See FloridaBar, 696 So.2d at 1181.
8. See infra notes 11-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 51-97 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
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II. THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW IN CALIFORNIA AND THE
BIRBROWER DECISION

In 1927, the California Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code
section 6125 as part of the State Bar Act, a comprehensive scheme regulating the
practice of law in the state." Section 6125 provides that "[n]o person shall practice
law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar."' 2 The
legislature enacted this provision specifically to ensure that those performing legal
services do so competently.' 3 Although not apparent from this definition,
individual parties may represent themselves and their own interests regardless of
State Bar membership. 4 The proscription against the unlicensed practice of law
only extends to an unlicensed person's representation of another. 5
Because section 6125 does not define what it means to "practice law," courts
have grappled with the breadth of the proscription. In the seminal case of People
v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 6 the California Supreme Court defined the

practice of law as follows:
[T]he practice of law is the doing or performing services in a court ofjustice, in any
matter depending therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity to the
adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be depending in a court. 7
In accordance with the Merchants'holding,California courts have consistently
held that it is the character of the act, not the forum, that determines whether an
activity constitutes the "practice of law."'" In Morganv. State Bar,9 the court held
that participating in settlement negotiations constitutes the practice of law.2" In

11. See J.W. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527, 530 (Ct. App. 1993).
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1998).
13. See J.W., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533.
14. See, e.g., Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a
non-licensed person may represent oneself but not others).
15. See J.W., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533 (refusing to permit a mother to represent her son in court).
16. 209 P. 363 (Cal. 1922).
17. Id. at 365 (quoting Eley v. Miller, 34 N.E. 836 (Ind. App. 1893).
18. See, e.g., Bluestein v. State Bar of California, 529 P.2d 599, 606 (Cal. 1974); Baron v. City
of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353, 356 (Cal. 1970); Crawford v. State Bar of California, 355 P.2d 490,495
(Cal. 1960); Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Cal. 1954).
19. 797 P.2d 1186 (Cal. 1990).
20. See id. at 1188.
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People v. Landlords ProfessionalServices,2' the court held that assisting in the
preparation of unlawful detainer complaints amounted to the practice of law.22
Finally, in In re Anderson,23 the court found that a paralegal's advice to potential
bankruptcy petitioners constituted the practice of law because such advice required
an "exercise of legal judgment beyond the knowledge and capacity of the lay
person."24
No California appellate court has addressed the precise issue of whether a
nonlawyer's representation of an investor in a private securities arbitration
constitutes the unlicensed practice of law. However, the California Supreme Court
recently held that representation of a party in private arbitration proceedings
constitutes the "practice of law."2 In Birbrower,Montalbano,Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Court, a New York law firm entered into a fee agreement with
ESQ Business Services, Inc. (ESQ), a California corporation, to represent it in a
contract dispute.26 The dispute was pending before the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) in California when the parties reached a'settlement.27 After
settlement, ESQ brought a suit for malpractice and refused to pay its attorney's
fees.2" Birbrower counterclaimed for breach of contract and quantum meruit for
time spent and services rendered.29
The Santa Clara Superior Court found the parties' fee agreement unenforceable because Birbrower had engaged in the unlicensed practice of law in California
by representing ESQ in the arbitration proceedings." After the court of appeal
denied the firm's request for a writ of mandate, the California Supreme Court
granted review on the sole issue of whether Birbrower's actions while representing
ESQ in California constituted the practice of law under section 6125. a"
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the Legislature did not define
key
phrase "practice of law."32 It then specifically adopted the Merchants'
the
definition, stating that the "practice of law" includes "giving ...legal advice and
counsel" regardless of the forum.33 Because the Birbrower lawyers flew to
California, discussed and advised on strategy, conducted settlement negotiations,
initiated the arbitration, and helped draft the settlement agreement, the court held

21. 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1989).
22. See id. at 553.
23. 79 B.R. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
24. See id. at 485.
25. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Ct., 949 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal.
1998).
26. See id. at 3.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 4.
29. See id.
30. See id. Although the persons representing ESQ in the arbitration were licensed attorneys, they
did not have a California license and, hence, were unlicensed for purposes of section 6125. See id.
31. See id. at 5.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 6.
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that its "'activities clearly constituted the practice of law' in California. '3 4 The
court even went so far as to characterize Birbrower's actions as "extensive practice
in this state."35
After Birbrower lost the next battle on whether its activities constituted the
practice of law "in California,"36 it sought an exception to section 6125's
proscription for work incidental to private arbitration.37 Birbrower argued that
arbitration rules involved "fundamental differences" from litigation relating to
discovery, evidence, compulsory process, and other procedures.3" Birbrower also
pointed to the California rule of procedure allowing nonlawyers to represent parties
in international conciliation or arbitration proceedings.39 The court rejected both
arguments, specifically declining the firm's "invitation to craft an arbitration
exception to section 6125's prohibition of the unlicensed practice of law."' After
stating that such an exception for private arbitration proceedings is strictly within
the province of the legislature, the court added that "private arbitration and other
alternative dispute resolution practices are important aspects of our judicial
system."4

In dissent, Justice Kennard opined that the majority relied on "an overbroad
definition of the term 'practice of law." 2 Citing Baron v. City of Los Angeles,43
Justice Kennard supported a narrower definition of the "practice of law"; one
limited to "the representation of another in a judicial proceeding or an activity
requiring the application of that degree of legal knowledge and technique possessed
only by a trained legal mind." Speaking directly to the arbitral forum, Justice
Kennard stated that "[riepresenting another in an arbitration proceeding does not
invariably present difficult or doubtful legal questions that require a trained legal

34. See id. at 7 (quoting Birbrower, Montalbono, Condon & Frank v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d 857, 862 (Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original).
35. See id.
36. See id.at 8. The firm argued that section 6125's purpose, to protect California residents from
incompetent attorneys, is not furthered by enforcing the statute against out-of-state attorneys because
they have demonstrated that they possess the knowledge and competency to obtain and maintain a
license to practice law in another jurisdiction. See id. The court rejected this argument, stating that
"other states' laws may differ substantially from California law" and "[c]ompetence in one jurisdiction
does not necessarily guarantee competence in another." See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974)).
39. See id. at 9; see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.351 (West 1998).
40. See Birbrower,949 P.2d at 9.
41. See id. (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
42. See id. at 13 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
43. 469 P.2d 363 (Cal. 1970).
44. See Birbrower,949 P.2d at 13 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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mind for their resolution."45 The majority called Justice Kennard's proposed
definition a "fanciful interpretation" of the relevant cases that "ignores Merchants'
altogether, and, in so doing, substantially undermines the legislature's intent
to
46
protect the public from those giving unauthorized legal advice and counsel.
By specifically holding that the "practice of law" includes the giving of "legal
advice and counsel" in connection with a private arbitration,47 the Birbrower
opinion has opened the door to challenge nonlawyer representation of investors in
securities arbitration. Given the litigious nature of securities arbitration today,
investor representation clearly falls within the Birbrowerdefinition. This, together
with securities arbitration reforms proposed by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), supports a very strong argument that investor
representation in arbitration even falls within Justice Kennard's very limited
definition48 requiring the "legal knowledge and technique" possessed by a licensed
attorney.
In accordance with the Birbrowerholding, the California Legislature amended
the Code of Civil Procedure to require out-of-state attorneys to meet certain
obligations before representing parties in private arbitrations in California.49
Effective January 1, 1999, non-California attorneys wishing to represent a party in
a California arbitration proceeding must certify his or her admission in another
state and retain a licensed California attorney to act as the "attorney of record" in
the case." Although the new statute is silent on nonlawyer, as opposed to
out-of-state lawyer representation in private arbitration proceedings, its mandate
for a California "attorney of record" in all California arbitrations suggests the need
for California-licensed attorney representation.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A LITIGIOUS SECURITIES ARBITRATION SYSTEM

In 1979, each of the various Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)5 that serve

45. See id. at 17 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 6.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 13 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
49. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West Supp. 1999).
50. See id.
51. Various stock exchanges and the NASD serve as SROs for the resolution ofsecurities disputes.
Currently, there are seven SROs that serve as arbitration forums: the NASD, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the Boston Stock Exchange, Inc., the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., the
Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Inc., the Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc., and the Pacific Stock Exchange,
Inc. Just recently, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. (PHLX) and the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) effectively transferred their arbitration programs to the NASD. AMEX merged with the
NASD for all purposes, and plans a "gradual phase-out of [its] arbitration program to NASD
regulation." See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 thereto by the American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Changes to the
Combination of the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 63 Fed. Reg. 49,766,49,771 (1998), availablein 1998 WL 633317. The PHLX remains a separate
SRO, but, as of October 1, 1998, it will not accept any new arbitration claims and has given the NASD
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as forums for securities arbitration adopted the Uniform Code of Arbitration
(Uniform Code), a set of rules drafted and proposed by the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA). SICA is a representative group of all of the
SROs, the Securities Industry Association (SIA)52 and the general public that
evaluates and addresses concerns expressed about the effectiveness of securities
arbitration.53 SICA drafted the Uniform Code to enhance fairness by creating
uniformity in all SRO arbitrations involving investors and broker-dealers.54
Since the United States Supreme Court sanctioned the privatization of
securities disputes in the late-1980's, SICA has significantly revised and reworked
the Uniform Code. 5 These revisions have stemmed from valid complaints by
investors that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements unfairly force them to
waive all rights appurtenant to litigation." The SROs almost automatically adopt
SICA's revisions, 7 and, as a result, the procedural rules for securities arbitration
now read much like a typical state's code of civil procedure.
The NASD, which handles practically all investor/broker securities disputes,58
now deals with extensive pre-hearing motion practice relating to discovery, statutes
of limitations, and other purely legal matters. 9 The NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure (NASD Code) also has departed from the relaxed evidentiary and
procedural standards that guided securities arbitration prior to the 1990s.
Furthermore, the NASD publicly acknowledged "[the increasingly litigious nature
of securities arbitration."' Securities arbitration, once considered the quickest,
simplest, and most cost-effective means of investor-broker dispute resolution,61

jurisdiction over all disputes. See PhiladelphiaStock Exchange Proposal to End Its Arbitration
ProgramApprovedby SEC, 10 SEC.ARB.COMMENTATOR, Oct. 1998, at 10 [hereinafterPhiladelphia].

52. SIA is a trade association for the securities industry. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities
ArbitrationAfter McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 362 n.9 (1988).
53. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-92-74, SEcuarrtEs ARBITRATION:
How INVESTORS FARE 15 (1992).

54. See Christopher J. Moeller, Comment, Your Forum or Mine? Where to Arbitrate
Investor-Broker Securities Claims, 1 J. DisP. RESOL. 63, 67 (199 1).

55. See Constantine N. Katsoris, PunitiveDamages in SecuritiesArbitration:The Tower of Babel
Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 581 (1991).
56. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
57. See Katsoris, supra note 2, at 451-52.
58. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (reporting that the NASD receives eighty-five

percent of all SRO arbitrations); see also Michael Siconolfi, Street EagerforArbitrationSuperforum,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1990, at C1. The NASD's virtual monopoly over securities arbitration disputes

will certainly rise in 1999 because two other SRO's with historically active arbitration dockets have
recently transferred their arbitration jurisdiction to the NASD. See Philadelphia,supra note 51, at 10.
59. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
60. See id.
61. See Moeller, supra note 54, at 68-69.

now resembles the "lumbering behemoth" better known as litigation."
Much to the chagrin of SICA, in 1994 the NASD appointed a "blue-ribbon
task force ' 63 to further address the various problems that undermine customer
confidence in the fairness of securities arbitration.' Two years later, the nine
person task force issued a 156-page report entitled "Securities Arbitration Reform"
containing more than seventy-five recommended revisions to the NASD Code.65
The NASD has yet to implement most of the recommendations and currently awaits
approval from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on the most significant
proposals.'
When implemented, these NASD recommendations will further enhance the
litigiousness of securities arbitration and render legal skill and expertise even more
crucial to representing investors. One of the task force's primary goals was to
provide investors in arbitration with the "rights they would have had in civil
litigation. ' 67 Its recommendation concerning discovery would make documents
discoverable only if they are "reasonably likely to be relevant and important to the
resolution of the issues in dispute. ' 68 This purely legal standard for discovery is
universally employed by courts to determine discoverability on a case-by-case basis
based on the arguments of counsel. Additionally, the task force's recommendation
concerning the eligibility of claims would "direct the arbitrators to resolve statute
of limitations issues based on applicable law."'69 This obviously requires both
knowledge and understanding of the various issues surrounding a particular state's
statutes of limitations.
IV. COMPROMISING THE RIGHTS OF INVESTORS: NONLAWYER
REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE INITIAL CONSULTATION THROUGH THE
ARBITRATION HEARING
Just like any lawsuit, investor claims in securities arbitration originate from
persons who feel that they have been wronged. These investors have lost money

62. See David E. Robbins, The NASD's ProposedChanges to Its ArbitrationProcedures Would
Affect Rules on Eligibility,PunitiveDamages, Discovery and the Selection ofArbitrators,NAT'LL.J.,
Feb. 12, 1996, at B6.
63. See Michael Siconolfi, New ArbitrationRules: Mixed BagforInvestors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
1996, at C1.
64. See Lynnette Khalfani, Two Panels Vie to Settle Securities Issues; Newcomer Accused of
Usurping Older Group's Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at A5 (reporting SICA's criticism of the
NASD for attempting to usurp its delegated function to manage, oversee, and make rules governing
SRO arbitration).
65. The NASD also specifically implored the other SROs to adopt the recommendations. See
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
66. See Linda D. Feinberg, et al., NASDR Dispute Resolution: Status ofArbitration Policy Task
Force Recommendations, in I SEC. ARBrTRATION 29, 33 (1998).
67. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.
68. See id. at 84.
69. See Feinberg, supra note 66, at 43.
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in a securities transaction and usually feel that their broker is to blame for that loss.
When an investor first presents the case to a potential representative, he or she
expects that person to analyze the claim and make a decision whether it is a
"winner." The investor also may inquire about the possibility of punitive damages
against the broker.
At this point, the representative must determine whether the broker-dealer
violated any legal duty owed to the investor, and, if so, whether that violation
caused any damages. This requires the representative to analyze the legal duties
broker-dealers owe to their customers, consider the relevant statutes of limitations
for claims based on violations of those duties, and discuss the various remedies that
exist. This requires a knowledge of the law exceeding that possessed by the
general public or those knowledgeable in the securities market.
Once the representative determines that an investor's claim is worth pursuing,
he or she then drafts and submits a demand for arbitration, setting forth what duties
the broker-dealer allegedly violated.70 Once the participating SRO serves the
demand on the responding broker-dealer, issues concerning settlement of the
dispute arise. In order to protect investor's rights during settlement negotiations,
a representative must have knowledge of the elements required to prove the claims
asserted and a familiarity with any legal precedent that affects the viability of those
claims.
Perhaps most importantly, during settlement negotiations, the investor's
representative should be able to justify the theory of damage to opposing counsel.
Particularly in the securities industry, this requires an understanding of the purely
legal concept of causation. The representative must persuasively explain why the
conduct of the broker-dealer, and not market conditions, the investor's own
decisions, or a third party's wrongdoing, caused the investor's loss. If the
representative cannot adequately explain the damages alleged, the broker-dealer is
unlikely to consider the claim seriously or offer any payment to settle the claims.7
If the parties do not immediately reach a settlement, the broker-dealer then
proceeds to file its response to the demand for arbitration.7" Just like a typical code
of civil procedure, the NASD Code allows various responses. First, the broker-dealer may file an answer to the demand for arbitration setting forth its various

70.

See NATIONALAss'N. OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., CODEOFARBrrRATION PROCEDURE [hereinafter

NASD CODE] § 10314(a) (1998).
71. If and when the parties reach a settlement, the investor's representative should participate in
drafting the settlement agreement, and, in doing so, should have knowledge of the various legal
ramifications of the settlement terms. For example, the representative should be prepared to advise the
investor about the various tax implications that can arise, and be avoided by the characterization of the
settlement funds.
72. See NASD CODE, supra note 70, § 10314(b).

legal defenses.73 The customary defenses asserted by broker-dealers include:
ratification, account stated, estoppel, waiver, laches, statute of limitations, and
mitigation. The broker-dealer may also file a counterclaim against the investor, a
cross-claim against any other named respondent, or a third-party claim against an
unnamed person or entity.74 The NASD Code also allows the broker-dealer to file
the California state court equivalent of a demurrer, challenging the demand for
arbitration on the grounds that it fails to state a claim and/or is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.75
The investor's representative must be prepared to respond to the legal issues
that arise at this stage, such as whether the statute of limitations is tolled, whether
the broker-dealer has a valid defense, or whether to move for severance of the
broker-dealer's cross-claim or third-party claim. This requires effective and
considerable legal research, a skill only learned by lawyers during a required one
year course in law school and necessarily perfected by the everyday practice of law.
Once the broker-dealer files its response, discovery inevitably becomes an
issue. Similar to rules of civil procedure, the NASD Code allows written discovery
in the form of interrogatories and document requests.76 During discovery, an
investor's representative must determine whether the information or documents
requested by the broker-dealer are relevant or protected from discovery by
privilege. In order to protect an investor's interests at this stage, a representative
must understand the legal concept of relevancy and be aware of and understand the
parameters of the attorney-client privilege,77 the marital privilege7" and the
physician-patient privilege.79
Regardless of the legal knowledge or experience of a nonlawyer representative, an investor represented by a nonlawyer sacrifices crucial legal rights during
the discovery process. The attorney-client privilege, which, with certain
exceptions, shields from discovery all confidential communications between a
lawyer and client, presupposes that the party seeking its protection is represented
by a licensed attorney and not a layperson." ° Because the privilege does not apply
to an investor-nonlawyer relationship, an investor's confidential communications
with his or her representative are discoverable. SICA has specifically declared that
the SROs have no power to extend the attorney-client privilege to
investor-nonlawyer communications." Although arbitrators often extend the
protections of the attorney-client privilege for reasons of fundamental fairness,

73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. § 10305.
76. See id. § 10321.
77. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1994).
78. See id. §§ 980-987.
79. See id. §§ 990-999.
80. See id. § 950 (defining a "lawyer" as "a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client
to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation").
81. See SICA REPORT, supra note 3, at519.
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investors have no way to assure themselves that their communications with
nonlawyers will be safe from disclosure.82
Equally important, the attorney work product doctrine, which protects from
disclosure the attorney's mental processes and strategies, does not apply to a
nonlawyer representative. 3 As such, respondents may freely discover the
nonlawyer's communications with potential witnesses and other fact finding
processes.
Just like rules of civil procedure, the NASD Code also provides for the filing
of a motion to compel responses to discovery requests that have garnered an
objection." In connection with a motion to compel, the investor's representative
must persuasively argue, both in writing and orally, the legal discoverability of the
documents or information sought. This exercise is the essence of litigation and
legal training, and a nonlawyer seriously undermines an investor's interests at this
juncture when faced with an experienced, trained lawyer on the opposing side.
The NASD Code now allows for the taking of depositions in certain
circumstances.85 In 1996, the NASD adopted specific procedures for "large and
complex" cases.8 6 If the claim at issue involves more than $1 million, including a
claim for punitive damages, or if the parties simply agree, the "large and complex"
procedures apply. 7 These procedures allow for more pre-hearing interaction with
the arbitrators, and they specifically contemplate "the deposition of. . . persons
who may possess information relevant to the disposition of an eligible matter and
who may not be available to testify at the hearings." 8 Because deposition practice
oftentimes involves a matching of wits between counsel, where even a relatively
experienced lawyer can be "steamrolled," a nonlawyer will be seriously disadvantaged in either taking or defending depositions. Additionally, if a third party
witness refuses to attend the deposition, a nonlawyer is helpless in having a court
issue a subpoena for that person's appearance. 9
Investors represented by nonlawyer representatives are perhaps most
disadvantaged at the hearing. Securities arbitration hearings typically last several

82. See id.
83. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018 (West 1998).
84. See NASD CODE, supra note 70, § 10321(d)(1).
85. See id. § 10334(f)(2).
86. See id. § 10334(a)(1).
87. See id.
88. See id. § 10334(f)(2). The "large and complex" procedures also allow for disposition by
summary judgment. See id. § 10334(f)(3).
89. Although the NASD Code gives arbitrators the power of the subpoena process as provided by
law, this power only extends to directing "the appearance of any person employed [by] or associated
with" an NASD member. See NASD CODE, supranote 70, § 10322(b).

days' and proceed just like a trial. The hearing begins with opening statements,
followed by direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the offering
of documentary evidence, and finally closing argument. 9 This process is very
familiar for experienced litigators who have studied trial strategies in law school
and continuing education courses and have utilized these strategies in court
numerous times. Experienced attorneys have developed examination techniques
to elicit certain evidence at the most effective time, while avoiding the introduction
of facts adverse to their case.92 As a result of this training and experience, licensed
attorneys will have an immeasurable advantage over nonlawyers at the most crucial
stage of the dispute. Indeed, even inexperienced and unskilled attorneys will have
a significant advantage over nonlawyers as a result of training and education. 93
Although the NASD Code attests that the Rules of Evidence do not strictly
guide arbitrators during the hearing," arbitration panels, which usually include at
least one licensed attorney, routinely sustain evidentiary objections as to relevancy,
hearsay, privilege, foundation, and form of the question. Without a thorough
understanding of these legal principles, nonlawyer representatives will compromise
the interests of their investor-clients during testimony by inviting otherwise
objectionable and prejudicial testimony.
After the arbitrators have issued their award, a party may seek confirmation,
modification, correction, or vacation of the award pursuant to applicable law.95
The party must direct these requests to a court of law, thus precluding a nonlawyer
representative from protecting an investor's interests at this juncture.96 Additionally, where the arbitrators issue an award in favor of the investor and the
broker-dealer does not voluntarily write a check to pay the award, the investor will
have to resort to an action at law to collect the award.
Beginning with the initial consultation and continuing through the post-hearing
procedures, nonlawyer representation in securities arbitration violates the primary
public policy underlying the strictures against the unlicensed practice of law;
protecting the public "from being advised and represented by persons who are not
'
qualified to practice law."97
The tasks required by a representative in connection
with a securities arbitration are purely legal and require an understanding of

90. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
91. See Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Securities Arbitration - Procedures,Strategies, Cases 10-7 (2d ed.
1992).
92. See John H. L'Estrange, Jr., et al., The Participationof UnlicensedAdvocates in California
in the Resolution of Disputes Between Investors andStockbrokers, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 73, 93 (1994).
93. See id. at 93.
94. See NASD CODE, supra note 70, § 10323.
95. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1994); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1287.6 (West 1997 & Supp.
1998).
96. However, the client of course can petition the court for such relief on his or her own, or pro
per. But under that scenario, the client hardly receives any benefit of the representation he or she has
paid for in retaining the nonlawyer representative.
97. See Russell v. Dopp, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 772 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Gerhard v. Stephens,
442 P.2d 692, 731 (1968)).
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numerous complex legal principles. Thus, in many circumstances, nonlawyer
representatives cannot represent an investor's interests competently. California's
tacit approval of nonlawyer representation in securities arbitration compromises
investor's rights and endangers their financial interests. For this reason, such
representation should be enjoined.
V. THE FALLACY THAT NONLAWYER REPRESENTATION IN SECURITIES
ARBITRATION PROVIDES A PUBLIC GOOD
In response to numerous complaints concerning the unethical conduct of
nonlawyer representatives in securities arbitration, in 1993 SICA considered an
amendment to the Uniform Code that would preclude nonlawyers from representing a party in arbitration for a fee.98 In connection with this proposed amendment,
SICA held two special meetings in California and Florida where it heard arguments
and comments from various nonlawyer representatives in favor of the status quo."
Nonlawyer representatives primarily argued that they can represent investors
more effectively than most attorneys." ° Concluding that securities arbitration is
fact driven and not legal, they asserted that their experience in the securities
industry provides investors more of a benefit than a legal education or license to
practice law.'
Admittedly, a representative with industry expertise benefits
investors because it allows for the evaluation of claims without the cost of expert
consultation. However, this argument is flawed in its assumption that securities
arbitration is fact driven and requires no knowledge or application of law. As set
forth above, securities arbitration now significantly resembles litigation, and
requires the skills and training possessed by a licensed attorney. " The benefit to
investors derived from industry experience does not outweigh the detriments that
come with representation by a person ill-equipped to competently handle the legal
issues that inevitably arise in securities arbitration.
At the SICA hearings, nonlawyer representatives also argued that they provide
a public good by increasing awareness of the arbitration process through
advertisement. 3 This argument also is fallacious. While surely public awareness

98. See SICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 512.
99. See id. at 513. SICA held these meetings in Florida and California because it found those
states to have the highest concentration of nonlawyer representatives. See id.
100. See id. at 521; see also L'Estrange, Jr., supra note 92, at 97.
101. See SICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 521-22. Most of the nonlawyer representatives that
appeared at the special meetings had prior experience in the securities industry. See id.
102. SICA agreed. It stated that "securities arbitration today involves many legal judgments" that
nonlawyer representatives cannot competently handle. See id.
103. See id. at 516-17.
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of arbitration is good, SICA found that the typical advertisements from nonlawyer
representatives mislead the public."° SICA identified and discussed various
advertisements from nonlawyer representatives that distorted "success rates,"
disparaged lawyers, and misrepresented legal affiliations. 15
The misleading advertisements detailed by SICA's report are not isolated
incidents. One business in San Diego now extols its practice on radio by claiming
that it has "a proven track record, recovering money in over 90 percent of [their]
cases.""'° The advertisement does not specify the average amount recovered as a
percentage of the investor's loss, leaving one to wonder whether its clients ever
recover more than the initial retainer. The same advertisement also claims that the
business can "help you recover your investment losses, even if the investment was
made up to six years ago." This misstates the NASD's eligibility rule, which
explicitly provides that the applicable state's statute of limitations governs all
NASD arbitration claims.' °7 For example, if an investor brings a suitability claim
based on an investment made just three years10ago,
California's two-year statute of
8
limitations would bar the claim as untimely.
Finally, nonlawyer representatives argued before SICA that they provide a
public good by taking the small cases that attorneys decline.0 9 Even assuming this
were true, and that nonlawyer representation allows broader access to arbitration,
it does not justify the practice. As SICA correctly determined in 1993, the perils
faced by investors with nonlawyer representation greatly outweigh the benefit of
greater access. 0' The Supreme Court of Florida, upon issuing its advisory opinion
enjoining nonlawyer representation in securities arbitration, specifically found that
any heightened awareness and greater access provided by nonlawyer representation
is outweighed by their improper motivation to settle their client's claims and overall
"business-like" approach to the practice.II
Perhaps most significant, SICA recognized that nonlawyer representatives,
unlike lawyers, are not supervised or subject to discipline by a state bar or any
other regulatory body." 2 As a result, instances of misleading advertising,
ineffective representation and unethical conduct go unregulated and unsanctioned.
Even the handling of a client's money on deposit is not regulated. Under these

104. Seeid. at516.
105. See id.
106. The thirty second advertisement currently runs on AM 540 XBACH in San Diego and offers
the services of a nonlawyer, "professional staff of consumer protection and securities experts to assist
you or someone you know that is a victim of misrepresentation, unauthorized trading, unsuitable
recommendations, churning, and limited partnership fraud."
107. See NASD CODE, supra note 70, § 10304 (providing that the six-year eligibility rule "shall not
extend applicable statutes of limitations").
108. See, e.g., Calvi v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 69, 70 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (applying
California's two-year statute of limitations for negligence).
109. See SICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 518.
110. Seeid.at522.
11. See Florida Bar,696So.2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1997).
112. See SICA REPORT, supra note 3,at518-19.
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circumstances, the public faces potential harm from nonlawyer representation that
can only be remedied by enjoining the practice.
SICA ultimately determined that nonlawyer representation in securities
arbitration constitutes the unlicensed practice of law." 3 However, rather than
enacting its proposed rule prohibiting such representation, SICA decided to leave
regulation up to the individual states." 4 Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida
acted upon SICA's suggestion and permanently enjoined nonlawyers from
representing investors in securities arbitration for a fee." ' California, the only
other state with a significant concentration of nonlawyer representatives," 6 has yet
to follow suit." 7
VI. CONCLUSION

Although securities arbitration was developed as a cheaper, quicker,
nonjudicial alternative for dispute resolution, the representation of an investor or
broker-dealer in arbitration today clearly constitutes the practice of law. A
representative must give legal advice and perform the traditional tasks of a lawyer
at every stage of the arbitration proceeding. Such representation, when performed
by nonlawyers, compromises the legal and financial interests of investors and
endangers the public. As such, the California Supreme Court should permanently
enjoin this practice.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Seeid. at524.
See id.
See FloridaBar, 696 So.2d at 1184.
See Klein, supra note 6, at 1607.
In late-1997, the Santa Barbara Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of seven

broker-dealers in their injunctive relief action against a nonlawyer representative on the ground that the
nonlawyer was engaged in the unlawful and unlicensed practice of law in violation of section 6125.
See Linsco/Private Ledger v. Sacks, No. 210875 (Cal. Nov. 13, 1997); Royal Alliance Associates, Inc.
v. Sacks, No. 210910 (Cal. Nov. 13, 1997). The nonlawyer has appealed this decision, and currently

awaits a ruling.

